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ALL DOGS GO TO HEAVEN ... OR DIVORCE COURT: NEW JERSEY
UN"LEASHES" A SUBJECTIVE VALUE CONSIDERATION
TO RESOLVE PET CUSTODY LITIGATION IN
HOUSEMAN v DARE
"Dogs are chairs; they're furniture; they're automobiles, they're pen-
sions. They're not kids."-The Honorable John Tomasello,
New Jersey Superior Court'
I. INTRODUCTION
Judge John Tomasello's harsh words may disturb a significant portion
of the country's pet owner population, as his statement lies in stark con-
trast to the genuine feelings of companionship expressed by many
humans towards their pets.2 Research indicates that humans derive sub-
stantial benefits from their companion animals and, reciprocally, that
owners often spend both time and money to ensure the health and happi-
ness of their pets.3 Nonetheless, state statutory and case law illustrates that
the traditional legal perception of pets does not coincide with modern
public sentiment.4 Though Judge Tomasello's statement may sound sur-
1. Jan Hefler, Case of Puppy Love: Ex-Couple Goes to Court, PmI.A. INQUIRER, July
28, 2009, at BI (referencing in-trial statement by NewJersey Superior CourtJudge
John Tomasello).
2. See RebeccaJ. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to
Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 181, 182 (2003) (outlining pets' important
familial role in household and development of relationship with humans).
3. See id. at 183-84 (describing companion animals as political assets and bene-
ficial to health of adults, children, and mentally ill); see also id. at 184-86 (detailing
favorable treatment of pets such as placement in "doggy day care" centers or spe-
cial hotels for animals, visits to "dog parks," and trips to veterinarian for expensive
preventive care and surgical procedures). Based on statistics from the 2009/2010
National Pet Owners Survey, sixty-two percent of United States households own at
least one pet, including more than thirty-eight million households that own a cat
and nearly forty-seven million households that own a dog. See AM. PET PRODS.
Ass'N, INDUSTRY STATISTICS & TRENDS, http://www.americanpetproducts.org/
pressjindustrytrends.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (listing findings of recent sur-
vey of pet owners in United States). One substantial benefit derived from pet own-
ership is that pets can be medically beneficial to people's health. See OFFICE OF
MED. APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE HEALTH BENEFITS
OF PETS (1987), available at http://consensus.nih.gov/1987/1987HealthBenefits
Petsta003html.htm (concluding that pets have beneficial impact on physical,
social, and psychological health of various groups of humans).
4. See Ann Hartwell Britton, Bones of Contention: Custody ofFamily Pets, 20J. AM.
AcAD. MATIUMONIAL LAw. 1, 2 (2006) (observing conflict between public opinion
and legal system's treatment of pets).
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prising, under the current legal framework in numerous states, his words
correctly articulate the law.5
The prevalence of animal legal rights issues has drastically increased
in recent years.6 Reacting to a growing effort by animal rights activists,
legislators, prosecutors, and legal scholars to reform the law to coincide
with society's perception of animals, the legal system established the foun-
dation for a "qualitative shift" that would redefine courts' treatment of
animals.7 In both criminal and civil contexts, doctrinal changes have ex-
panded the legal protections and rights afforded to animals.8 Revisions to
statutory language delineating the relationship between humans and their
companion animals is just one example of the several changes undertaken
5. See, e.g., Heidi Stroh, Puppy Love: Providing for the Legal Protection of Animals
When Their Owners Get Divorced, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHIcs 231, 232 (2007) (highlight-
ing that many U.S. courts base animal custody dispute decisions on principles of
property law); see also Elizabeth Paek, Recent Developments, Fido Seeks Full Member-
ship in the Family: Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals by Stat-
ute, 25 U. HAw. L. REv. 481, 491 (2003) ("Although companion animals are
considered family members by their animal guardians, established legal doctrine
classifies these animals as property."). In addition to judicially created definitions,
some states further codify the idea that pets are property in statutes. See Paek,
supra, at 490-91 (explaining why pets possess very few legal rights in United States).
For example, Pennsylvania's Dog Law explicitly provides for this notion. See 3 PA.
CONs. STAT. ANN. § 459-601 (a) (West 2008) (declaring dogs to be personal prop-
erty in Pennsylvania).
6. See Drake Bennett, Lawyer for the Dog: Inside the Booming Field of Animal Law,
in Which Animals Have Their Own Interests-and Their Own Lawyers, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 9, 2007, at Dl, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/
articles/2007/09/09/lawyer for-the-dog/ (noting estate and divorce lawyers see-
ing rise in number of pet trusts and pet custody disputes).
7. See id. ("[F]or literally thousands of years animals have been part of per-
sonal property . .. but in the past five years we're seeing courts take a broader view
that . .. our relationship with them is more complex than that."); see also Britton,
supra note 4, at 26-29 (observing legal changes providing more rights to pets). The
1990 Uniform Probate Code included a section validating a trust for the care of a
pet and its offspring, and several states adopted a similar law. See Britton, supra
note 4, at 27 (demonstrating how states allow pet owners to leave money to pets
following owner's death). Furthermore, the type of damages a pet owner can re-
cover after his or her animal is injured by another individual is expanding as well.
See id. at 27-28 (observing that damages for injury to animal is topic "where the
current legal status of animals is being particularly challenged, especially when the
animal is a dog"). The trend is to allow for more than simply the market value of a
pet, with the justification being that the primary value of a pet to its owner is emo-
tional, not financial. See id. at 29 (explaining that pet owners view pets' real value
as deriving from relationship between animal and human companion).
8. See id. at 25-30 (summarizing various protections afforded by law to com-
panion animals, including "the ability of persons to provide for pets after their
owner's demise" and implementation of statutes governing injury to dogs); see also
Bennett, supra note 6, at D1 ("In the past decade, 42 states have passed felony
animal cruelty laws, and in most states it's now possible to serve time in prison
solely on an animal cruelty conviction (though most states now exempt farm ani-
mals from animal cruelty laws).").
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by states and municipalities to better reflect the vital role that pets play in
Americans' lives.9
Despite this trend, family law courts generally continue to rely on
long-established policies that fail to acknowledge modern societal opin-
ions when deciding cases involving disputes over the custody of compan-
ion animals following their owners' separation or divorce. 10 Often based
on a lack of authority or a reluctance to depart from legal precedent, the
majority of family law courts refuse to diverge from a strict application of
property law." Still, some judges have at least recognized that unjust and
unfair consequences can result from such treatment, and many critics
have taken exception to the view that a companion animal can be divided
among parties in the same manner as any inanimate personal property. 12
Thus, published opinions in pet custody cases appear inconsistent, differ-
ing widely in their reasoning and application of legal theories.13
9. See Huss, supra note 2, at 197-98 (listing municipalities that have taken
phrase pet "owner" and replaced it with pet "guardian" in local statutes).
10. See Paek, supra note 5, at 484 (contrasting results of animal owners' survey
with established legal doctrine classifying animals as property). Some courts have
drifted from the traditional property analysis to better account for owners' view of
their companion animals as family members. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 236 (illus-
trating some courts' apparent disdain for pet ownership decisions based on prop-
erty law, instead preferring "a more humane approach, which would take into
account the effect of their decision on the mental and emotional health of the
pet"). These departures from the standard property analysis demonstrate the cur-
rent lack of clarity and ad hoc approach of the judicial system to issues of pet
custody. See id. at 232 (advocating for clear instructions to courts to reconcile pet
custody decisions). For a discussion of several types of custody disputes other than
those following divorce, see Huss, supra note 2, at 203.
11. See Paek, supra note 5, at 499-500 (describing facts of case where judge
ruled that companion dog is not fungible item, yet still denied plaintiffs claims for
emotional distress damages based solely on legal doctrine of animals as property);
see also Neil E. Hendershot, What the General Practitioner Needs to Know About Penn-
sylvania Animal Law: Personal and Estate Planning for Pennsylvanians Owning Pets, 77
PA. B. Ass'N Q. 107, 108 (2006) (highlighting argument of pet owners for in-
creased property rights for tort claims involving pets); Tabby T. McLain, Knick-
Knack, Paddy-Whack, Give the Dog a Home?: Custody Determination of Companion Ani-
mals upon Guardian Divorce, ARTICLES (Animal Legal & Historical Ctr., Mich. State
Coll. of Law, E. Lansing, Mich.), 2009, http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ddus
petcustodyindivorce.htm (discussing that judges who reject request to treat com-
panion animals as marital property do so "usually based on a lack of authority to
make an exception").
12. See Paek, supra note 5, at 499-500 ("[A] companion dog is not a living
room sofa or dining room furniture." (quoting Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627
N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001))). But see McLain, supra note 11 (determining that
there is no direct basis in law for treating pet custody determinations any differ-
ently than when deciding ownership of couple's big screen television).
13. See Huss, supra note 2, at 222, 228 (condensing pet custody case law to
illustrate courts' broad discretion in awarding marital property in divorce cases,
especially because there is no set standard for deciding custody after break-up of
relationship).
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Pet custody was once a topic ignored by legal literature, lacking in
published opinions, and subject to judicial hostility.1 4 Today, state legisla-
tors are introducing specialized pet custody laws, scholarly works and me-
dia publications are noting a recent escalation in pet custody cases, and
commentators are realizing that some individuals will fight harder over
the custody of their pet following a divorce than over human members of
their family.15 Scholars attribute the emergence of pet custody litigation
14. See Britton, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing how burdens on family law courts
make some judges unwilling to properly examine and rule on pet custody cases).
Some custody cases have seemingly contained ridiculous facts and circumstances,
leading to sarcastically critical commentary from judges and humorous media re-
ports. See id. at 3-4 (summarizing facts of Tennessee case in which wife presented
testimony during her argument for custody of pet that "the dog seemed to enjoy
the Bible study she conducted in the home and, therefore, should remain with
her," while husband responded that "the dog seemed to enjoy riding on the back
of his motorcycle and, therefore, should remain with him"); see also Posting ofJohn
to The Legal Reader Commentary on Law, Politics, and Everything Else That Mat-
ters, http://www.legalreader.com/archives/003753.html (May 8, 2007, 19:27 EST)
(detailing case mocked in some media reports where dog, which was subject of
custody battle after owner's death, was appointed own lawyer). This contributed to
the opinion of many in the legal community that pet custody was not a serious
issue, unworthy of judicial time and resources. See Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d
109, 110-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Our courts are overwhelmed with the su-
pervision of custody, visitation, and support matters related to the protection of
our children. We cannot undertake the same responsibility as to animals."); Brit-
ton, supra note 4, at 6 (referring to judge's statement that pet custody case
presented to him was "a stupid issue" and that parties should not "take up ajudge's
time" with it "when there are children to be cared for and support to be
enforced").
15. See Ronald J. Shaffer, Canine Custody Is Alive and Well in New Jersey, HEALTH
NEWs DiG., May 3, 2009, http://www.healthnewsdigest.com/news/Guest
Columnist_710/CanineCustody-isAlive-and WellinNewjersey.shtml (dis-
cussing special relationship between pet owners and their pets and noting that
"with the proliferation of pets and their enhanced status within the home, it is not
surprising that these types of cases will continue to come before judges"); see also
Britton, supra note 4, at 7 (acknowledging rise in number of pet custody cases "to
the point that the issues form an area of specialization"); Paek, supra note 5, at 503
("More recently, companion animals have increasingly become the subject of cus-
tody and visitation disputes."); Bennett, supra note 6 (indicating that pet custody
disputes are increasingly common fixture in divorce cases and profiling animal
behavior specialist consulted in courts' decisions); Hefler, supra note 1 (citing at-
torney specializing in animal rights cases that "many judges are now being asked to
decide who gets the pet when there is a breakup"); McLain, supra note 11 (explain-
ing that courts are being asked to greater extent than ever to resolve companion
animal custody disputes); Maryann Mott, Avoid a Canine Custody Battle, THE Doc
DAILY, http://www.thedogdaily.com/netscape/Happy/avoid-canine-custody
battle/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (reporting that members of Ameri-
can Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers have stated that within last five years pets
have represented "new kind of battleground as couples attempt to work out di-
vorce settlements"). Michigan and Wisconsin legislators proposed the nation's
first bills outlining how separating couples must handle the placement of their
pets. See Gerri L. Elder, Wolverines Follow Badgers with Pet Custody Legislation, ToTAL
DIVORCE, http://www.totaldivorce.com/news/articles/process/pet-custody.aspx
(last visited Mar. 17, 2010) ("While some judges and attorneys don't see the need
for Sak's bill, he is not the first to propose such legislation."); see also P.J. Huffstut-
450 [Vol. 55: p. 447
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to higher divorce rates, the legal recognition of non-marital relationships,
and the fact that more couples remain childless for a longer period of
time, causing pet owners to form a stronger emotional bond with their
animal. 16 At a time when pet custody battles are becoming more preva-
lent, it is important to assess the potential legal approaches to which
courts adhere when deciding these cases.1 7 An exploration of the body of
case law on the subject reveals that judges disagree considerably on a pet's
legal status and how a court should determine its rightful residence.' 8
Because pet custody is an emerging field of law and lacks definitive
standards or results, the subject is gaining judicial attention and is in des-
perate need of clarified precedent and clear guidance.' 9 In 2009, in
Houseman v. Dare,20 the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court issued a precedential, landmark decision when it determined that
specific performance can be available as a remedy for the breach of an
oral agreement involving ownership of a pet.2 1 The appellate court was
the first in the state, though not the first in the nation, to recognize that
ter, Divorce Bill Sets Rules for Pet Custody, LJWORLD.COM, July 15, 2007, http://
www2.ljworld.com/news/2007/jul/15/divorce_bill_sets-rules-pet-Custody/ (pro-
viding background information on proposed pet custody bill in Wisconsin).
16. See Britton, supra note 4, at 21 (listing factors contributing to increase in
number of pet custody cases).
17. See generally McLain, supra note 11 (grouping pet custody decisions into
categories based on type of legal analysis applied by court).
18. See Huss, supra note 2, at 227 (discussing negatives of ad hoc nature of pet
custody decisions that forces courts to "make up" standard when ruling); see also id.
at 224 ("Just as with visitation schedules with children, people can also structure
their visitation with pets to occur for a block of time during the year."). Compare
DeSanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (dismissing appel-
lant's claim that court should enforce agreement providing for visitation of dog
because that would be similar to seeking arrangement for visitation of table or
lamp), with In re Marriage of Tevis-Bleich, 939 P.2d 966, 967 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding couple's divorce settlement granting husband visitation of dog).
These conflicting holdings subject the divorcing or separating couple to a high
degree of uncertainty when attempting to create their own arrangements for cus-
tody of the dog. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 249 (criticizing lack of consistency in
enforcement of contracts regarding pet custody and visitation).
19. See Posting of Neetal Parekh to Law & Daily Life: The FindLaw Life, Fam-
ily and Workplace Law Blog, http://blogs.findlaw.com/law-and_1ife/2009/08/
(Aug. 3, 2009, 12:58 EST) (opining that issue is becoming "ripe for clarified prece-
dence" because of lack of definitive results); see also Britton, supra note 4, at 1
(declaring that issue of pet custody has shifted to forefront and made it more
difficult for courts to continue to regard pets as chattels); Huss, supra note 2, at
227 (suggesting that clearer guidelines and set standard for awarding custody of
animals after break-up of relationship would benefit all parties); Stroh, supra note
5, at 232 (criticizing apparent irregularities in judicial system's determination of
pet custody disputes and proposing that courts receive guidance to better recon-
cile decisions); Hefler, supra note 1, at BI (interviewing attorney who observed that
while "more than a handful of scattered cases have been decided and published"
regarding pet custody, there is no real consensus).
20. 966 A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
21. See id. at 27 (holding trial court's conclusion that specific performance
was not available as matter of law unsustainable).
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certain animals have a unique, subjective value that distinguishes them
from other types of personal property.22 Like some other recent cases
involving the ownership of pets, the litigants' dispute was widely publi-
cized, thus generating national attention for the issue of pet custody, illus-
trating the significant attachment between companion animals and their
owners, and signifying the societal importance of pets in the United
States. 23 Houseman may be an indication that divorce courts are beginning
to parallel other areas of the law in how they handle the growing role of
companion animals in the lives of humans. 24
This Note discusses the New Jersey appellate court's holding in light
of other state judicial opinions and legislation concerning the ownership
of companion animals following a couple's separation or divorce.25 Simi-
lar to New Jersey's precedent-setting approach, this Note proposes a
framework for resolving pet custody disputes that recognizes the evolving
legal status of animals yet refrains from burdening family law courts with
the difficult and time-consuming task of determining the "best interests"
of a non-human being.2 6 Part II summarizes state statutory and case law
involving the treatment of companion animals in disputes over their own-
ership and possession.27 Part III details the facts giving rise to the holding
in Houseman and outlines the Superior Court's analysis in holding that
pets have a special subjective value to their owners, therefore permitting a
court to order a remedy of specific performance.2 8 Part IV examines the
reasoning behind the New Jersey Superior Court's approach to resolving
22. See id. at 28 (supporting idea that pets have special subjective value to
human owners); see also Mary Pat Gallagher, judges May Invoke Specific Performance
Remedy, N.J Appeals Panel Says, N.J. L.J., Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202428985476 (observing that decision in case
set precedent within state).
23. See Britton, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that numerous media-reported
cases involving issues of pet custody compensate "for the shortage of officially re-
ported cases"); see alsoJeane Macintosh, Splitsville Duo in 3rd Tug for Pug, N.Y. POST,
July 31, 2009, at 8, available at http://www.nypost.com/f/print/news/regional/
splitsville-duo inrdtug-for.-pugdx90iFhQNisCe9Rcos65bJ (exemplifying typi-
cal report in national publication discussing Houseman and Dare's dispute); Ex
Couple's Court Fight for Pug May Change Laws, MSNBC INTERACHWE, Aug. 2, 2009,
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/32240294/ns/today-today-pets/ (illustrating so-
cietal interest in topic of pet custody disputes).
24. See Hefler, supra note 1 (commenting that lawyer specializing in animal
rights called Houseman "a landmark decision" for its holding that money damages
were not adequate compensation for pet).
25. For a discussion of the development of pet custody jurisprudence, see in-
fra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of a proposal that courts adopt the approach recently
taken by the New Jersey Superior Court in Houseman, see infra notes 107-37 and
accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of cases and statutes concerning animal law in general
and pet custody disputes in particular, see infra notes 31-71 and accompanying
text.
28. For a discussion of the facts of the case and the Superior Court's analysis
in Houseman, see infra notes 72-106 and accompanying text.
452 [Vol. 55: p. 447
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this particular case and argues that the court's valuation of companion
animals offers the best resolution and could be applied to the majority of
future pet custody disputes.29 Finally, Part V contemplates the impact
Houseman will have on the status of animals in several areas of the law.3 0
II. VARYING APPROACHES TO PET CUSTODY ISSUES CREATE A "MIXED-
BREED" OF DECISIONS
The request for legal change is most vocal, and the need for clarity
most evident, when courts are compelled to resolve a pet ownership dis-
pute between two parties that claim possession of ajointly owned compan-
ion animal following the termination of a relationship.31 Often, a court's
decision to issue its ruling in accordance with either property law or an
alternative framework will be affected by the judge's personal opinion as
to the legal status of companion animals.3 2 As a result, scholars observe
dramatic variations between different jurisdictions, with courts reaching
conclusions on an "arguably arbitrary basis."33
A. The Common Law and the Property "Pedigree"
Historically, courts viewed animals that were not capable of providing
food for humans, whether as the producer or the source, as property that
lacked any intrinsic value.34 This categorization, articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Sentell v. New Orleans,35 led to the common law
rule that modem companion animals are tangible personal property.3 6 In
turn, this became the prevailing theory courts adopted when presented
with an argument over which spouse should receive ownership of a
29. For a critical analysis of the opinion rendered in Houseman and an argu-
ment for applying the Houseman approach in future pet custody disputes, see infra
notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
30. For an application of the holding in Houseman to the legal and veterinary
community, see infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
31. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 249 (pointing out apparent arbitrariness of pet
ownership litigation decisions).
32. See id. (finding that judges' personal views about legal status of pets "will
influence the extent to which the matter is decided according to property law or a
veiled 'best interest of the animal' standard").
33. See id. (observing disparity between courts in what type of law is applied to
pet ownership disputes, and explaining that "variations between jurisdictions or
courts can . . . be dramatic").
34. See Britton, supra note 4, at 4 (deeming Tennessee court's decision "an
exceptional departure" from common law rules because it treated pet as more
than "an inferior sort of property"); Huss supra note 2, at 7 (explaining historical
perception of animals by their human owners).
35. 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
36. See id. at 700-02 (comparing legal status of dogs to that of other animals
and concluding their status is somewhere between "animals feroe naturoe" and
domestic animals); see also id. at 706 (explaining that dogs have legal guarantees
similar to personal property in certain situations).
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couple's domestic animals following a divorce or separation.3 7 Classifica-
tion of dogs (and sometimes other domestic animals) as personal property
is either explicitly codified in state statutory definitions, or established by
state judges based on the traditional common law designation of animals
as personal chattel.3 8
Courts in jurisdictions adhering to the traditional property approach
to a companion animal's legal status resolve pet custody claims in the same
manner that they divide and award possession of other marital property.3 9
Thus, principles of asset division and ownership rights, along with theories
centered on state contract and property law, are commonly utilized in
these cases. 40 For example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania refused to
37. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 232 (demonstrating that judges "commonly look
to existing property law to guide their decision" in pet custody cases).
38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 1708 (2001) ("All dogs shall be deemed
personal property and may be the subject of theft pursuant to Chapter 5 of Title
11."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 25-2807 (2000) ("Dogs are property; and when the value
of any dog is material in any civil or criminal proceeding in this state, the same
may be established under the usual rules of evidence relating to values of personal
property."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 351.25 (West 2001) ("All dogs under six months of
age, and all dogs over said age and wearing a collar with a valid rabies vaccination
tag attached to the collar, shall be deemed property."); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 258.245 (LexisNexis 2005) ("All dogs that have a valid rabies vaccination and
bear identification are hereby declared to be personal property and subjects of
larceny."); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193.021 (LexisNexis 2006) (asserting that "per-
sonal property" includes dogs); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-1 (LexisNexis 2004) ("That
dogs ... shall be deemed and considered as personal property, and all remedies
given for recovery of personal property and of damages for injuries thereto are
hereby extended to them."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1717 (West 2002) ("All
animals of the dog kind, whether male or female, shall be considered the personal
property of the owner thereof, for all purposes."); OR. REV. STAT. § 609.020 (2009)
("Dogs are hereby declared to be personal property."); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6585
(2008) ("All dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property and may be the
subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass."); see also Sentell, 166 U.S. at
700 (acknowledging that " [b]y the common law, as well as by the law of most, if not
all, the States, dogs are so far recognized as property that an action will lie for their
conversion or injury"); Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (finding that lower court "lacked authority to order visitation with personal
property" and that "the dog would properly be dealt with through the equitable
distribution process"); DeSanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) ("Despite the status owners bestow on their pets, Pennsylvania law considers
dogs to be personal property."); Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) ("A dog is personal property, ownership of which is recognized
under the law.").
39. See Huss, supra note 2, at 221-22 (comparing treatment of animals in prop-
erty settlements to other forms of personal property); Stroh, supra note 5, at 237
("On the other hand, when the pet was acquired jointly at some time during the
marriage, it is considered marital property."); McLain, supra note 11 ("In order to
understand how custody determinations of companion animals are currently
made, it is important to examine that concept in the general context of property
allocation during divorce.").
40. See Bennett, 655 So. 2d at 111 (remanding case to trial court "to award the
animal pursuant to the dictates of the equitable distribution statute"); Wolf v. Tay-
lor, 197 P.3d 585, 587 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (applying contract law to determine
whether agreement concerning visitation of dog was legal contract); DeSanctis, 803
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honor a property settlement between a divorced couple that gave posses-
sion of the dog to the wife and visitation rights to the husband after it
concluded that Pennsylvania law considers dogs to be personal property,
and, based on contract law, that a court cannot enforce a visitation sched-
ule with personal property.41 Such lack of authority to grant visitation
rights to pets because they are considered property is echoed by divorce
courts in several other states.42 Ultimately, courts often award the pet to
the individual who can prove the strongest ownership rights, usually
demonstrated by examples of financial support for the pet.4 3 Although
some courts have criticized the underlying unfairness and stringency of
this approach, judges nevertheless find themselves bound by law to award
ownership of the pet strictly on the basis of legal title.44
In addition to litigation over pet custody, there are two types of pet
custody proceedings that, although not necessarily involving litigation, still
A.2d at 232 (holding appellant's claim meritless because he overlooked fact that
agreement was void and unenforceable contract as it attempted "to award custo-
dial visitation with or shared custody of personal property"); see also McLain, supra
note 11 (explaining that property divisions in divorce cases are based upon several
considerations). When courts look to whether the parties have reached any agree-
ment or stipulation regarding property division on their own, the analysis will be
based in contract law. See McLain, supra note 11 (detailing courts' treatment of
post and ante nuptial property distribution agreements between parties); see also
Huss, supra note 2, at 229-30 (advocating that parties, whether roommates or in
relationship, decide in advance "the disposition of any companion animals at the
time of their separation," as parties can use contract law to allocate custody of
animal).
41. See DeSanctis, 803 A.2d at 232 (finding that agreement between parties
explicitly awarded property in question to wife and cannot be modified to assign
custodial visitation rights to piece of personal property). The court struck down
the appellant husband's request for injunctive relief to mandate "shared custody"
of the dog as provided by a purported property settlement that was never incorpo-
rated or merged into the Divorce Decree, reasoning that:
In seeking "shared custody" and a "visitation" arrangement, Appellant ap-
pears to treat Barney, a dog, as a child. Despite the status owners bestow
on their pets, Pennsylvania law considers dogs to be personal prop-
erty.. .. As the trial court aptly noted, Appellant is seeking an arrange-
ment analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule for a table or a lamp.
This result is clearly not contemplated by the statute.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., Diane Sullivan & Holly Vietzke, An Animal Is Not an iPod, 4 J.
ANIMAL L. 41, 55 (2008) ("Because animals are property, often divorce courts are
left in the difficult position of who gets custody to be resolved typically on a basis of
title to the property .... Accordingly, courts generally lack the authority to grant
visitation of property.").
43. See Britton, supra note 4, at 5 (observing that parties showing receipts of
purchase and veterinary care can "build a strong case for keeping the animal,
whether that person has suitable housing for the animal or not").
44. See Akers v. Sellers, 54 N.E.2d 779, 779-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1944) (recogniz-
ing "tragedy" that would occur if dog was given to appellee if dog's love, affection,
and loyalty were actually for appellant, but still ruling on dog's ownership solely
based on which party had legal title); Huss, supra note 2, at 236 (commenting on
negative effects of basing decisions on property law principles in disputes over pet
ownership).
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lead to judicial rulings treating pets as household property.4 5 First, there
are instances in which one party acquired a pet prior to the marriage or
beginning of the relationship. 46 Based on principles of property law, the
pet is excluded from the process of asset division upon divorce and re-
tained by the spouse that was its original owner. 47 Second, when courts
are asked to divide a divorcing couple's assets, pets are generally treated in
the same manner as tangible personal property items such as chairs and
appliances. 48 Typically, under the doctrine of equitable distribution, the
pet is assigned a monetary value based on its fair market value and then is
partitioned along with the other marital assets in a property settlement.4 9
45. See McLain, supra note 11 (categorizing different types of examples where
courts must decide which spouse receives companion animal).
46. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
("The former husband contested this decision and filed a motion for rehearing
alleging that the dog was a premarital asset.").
47. See Britton supra note 4, at 5 ("Property owned prior to the marriage is
excluded from that division."). This would be classified as non-marital "separate"
or "non-community" property, depending on the jurisdiction. See McLain, supra
note 11 (defining non-marital types of property). Because only marital assets are
divisible in a divorce judgment, a pet acquired by one spouse before the marriage
would be distributed to that spouse. See id. ("Absent a statutory exception, sepa-
rate property is distributed to the owning spouse."). In cases where the compan-
ion animal is deemed separate or non-community property, the court need not
consider the value of the animal. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 237 (asserting that
acquisition of property prior to marriage is not subject to requirement of equitable
distribution upon parties' divorce).
48. See Britton, supra note 4, at 4-5 (describing methods of asset division upon
divorce used to divide both dogs and common household property); see also Mc-
lain, supra note 11 (defining courts' role when ordering property allocation de-
cree). These types of cases are not specific fights about the possession and
ownership of the couple's companion animal, but rather are general dilemmas
over the division of all marital property following a divorce. See McLain, supra note
11 ("Finally, when the couple is unable to reach an agreement themselves ... the
court instead will divide the remaining property."). When this type of case is
presented to a court, the court will look to the state's divorce statutes to determine
how to properly divide the ex-couple's belongings, including their pets. See id.
(stating that in community property states, property is divided to produce "half-
and-half split," and in equitable distribution state, property is divided based on
what court considers to be "fair and equitable").
49. See Huss, supra note 2, at 221-22 (examining pets' treatment as personal
property in property settlements); Stroh, supra note 5, at 237-38 (criticizing
method of assigning value to pets that is not correlated to actual worth to owners).
There are several criticisms directed at courts' action in awarding a pet to one of
the parties based only on principles of equitable distribution. See id. at 237 (argu-
ing that courts using equitable distribution principles demonstrate indifference to
fate of companion animals). Mainly, the challenge in assigning a concrete value to
a pet leads to a lack of uniformity among courts. See id. at 237-38 ("When it comes
to determining the fair market value of pets, courts frequently find that standard
property law provides little guidance on valuation methods."). Values "fluctuate
wildly," from zero to thousands of dollars, depending on the breed or pedigree of
the pet. See id. at 238 (illustrating range of prices assigned to pets by courts).
Moreover, critics of grouping pets with other tangible marital property contend
that a pet's true worth simply cannot be measured by these factors, as its true value
exists in the bond shared with its owner. See id. (noting that fair market value fails
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B. Teaching an Old Law New Tricks
There is widespread dissatisfaction with courts' application of a strict
property model in resolving pet custody issues.5 0 Critics of this framework
cite companion animals' increasing role within the American family and
overall changes to the family structure as reasons for abandoning the old
laws and replacing them with more modern and accepting rules.5 1 In
their disagreement with the traditional approach, animal rights activists
have made several proposals, which courts have considered when depart-
ing from the property law analysis.5 2 One proposal these advocates con-
sistently suggest, and which the Houseman court considered in its decision,
invites the judge to identify and assess the "best interests of the animal"
when deciding litigation about companion-animal custody.5 3
to account for sentimental worth of animal). Finally, equitable distribution judg-
ments are final, making it extremely difficult to modify decisions regarding a pet's
living situation should the need arise. See id. at 237 (commenting that courts are
often "powerless" to modify decisions even if animal's living situation worsens, be-
cause equitable distribution judgments are final).
50. See, e.g., Akers v. Sellers, 54 N.E.2d 779, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1944) (expres-
sing no opinion about whether best interests or property law model should be
applied to case, but commenting that determinations in pet custody cases on basis
of legal title is "brutal and unfeeling"); Hendershot, supra note 11, at 109 ("Pet
owners . . . do not share the law's view of their pets as tangible personal property
akin to inanimate objects.").
51. See McLain, supra note 11 (elaborating on criticisms of traditional prop-
erty approach used by some courts and exploring changes to judicial system re-
garding pet custody disposition). The American family structure has greatly
evolved from the time when dogs were deemed to be personal property. See id.
(concluding that greater importance of pets in society attributed to changing fam-
ily structure). Today, there is a lower birth rate, a higher divorce rate, and it is
more common for households to consist of pets but not human children. See id.
(identifying characteristics of modem American families that are different from
American families during other eras). Modem courts display an awareness of the
evolution of the American family and pets' role within it. See Morgan v. Kroupa,
702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997) ("Thus, modem courts have recognized that pets
generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law principles.").
52. See id. (rejecting strict property analysis in response to cultural trend that
pets serve as members of family); see also Ballas v. Ballas, 3 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1960) (finding community and separate property classification of divorced
couple's dog "immaterial" in granting custody to wife).
53. See Houseman v. Dare, 966 A.2d 24, 28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
(assessing ability of courts to decide best interests of animal); Brief for Animal
Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 23-25, Houseman v.
Dare, 966 A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (No. A-002415-07T2) (stating
"in custody disputes like this one, many courts reject a strict property analysis and
consider instead the best interests of the animal"); Brief for Lawyers in Defense of
Animals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 9-11, Houseman v. Dare, 966
A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (No. A-002415-07T2) ("It is the family
court's special responsibility to . . . safeguard the interests of the animal at the
center of a custody dispute."); R. Scott Nolen, New Jersey Court Says Consider Pet's
Special Value in Custody Cases, 234J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1100 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.avma.org/oninews/javma/may09/090501j.asp (reacting to New
Jersey court's rejection of best interests standard in Houseman); Paek, supra note 5,
at 521 ("Considering the best interests of the companion animal when determin-
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Proponents of the best interests approach recommend that courts im-
plement a method comparable to that required by all states in determin-
ing which parent retains custody of children following a divorce. 54
Adjusting the child custody criteria with some "specific species-based mod-
ifications," one animal rights group offered a list of factors for a court to
explore when conducting an independent analysis of the animal's inter-
ests.5 5 Most courts reject this analysis because it conflicts with pets' legal
status as personal property; however, some courts have either explicitly or
implicitly allowed the best interests of the pet to be at least part of the
decision regarding which party should gain custody.-6
Unlike the vast majority ofjurisdictions, courts in both New York and
Virginia have relied on the best interests of the animal to resolve pet cus-
tody disputes.5 7 For example, a New York appellate court allowed a cat to
remain with a roommate who was not the cat's original owner, considering
ing custody and visitation disputes acknowledges companion animals as family
members rather than property."); Bennett, supra note 6 (interviewing animal be-
havior specialist who serves as consultant in divorce cases and makes recommenda-
tion based partially on party with which pet bonds best, and expressing surprise
that court's decision "would factor in the pet's own predilections").
54. See McLain, supra note 11. There are several inquiries that courts must
address when considering the best interests of a child. See id. (specifying how
courts determine which parent retains custody of children in divorce cases). Com-
mon factors include the parent's ability to perform reasonable parental obliga-
tions, the wishes of the child and the parents, the interaction between the child
and the parents, "the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, and
the child's adjustment to home, school, and community." See id. (quoting THOMAS
JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAw: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 6:6 (2009)).
55. See id. (considering Animal Legal Defense Fund's advice regarding best
interests approach); Joyce Tischler & Bruce Wagman, Lawyers Must Plan for More Pet
Custody Cases, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, Aug. 18, 2006, http://aldf.org/article.
php?id=308 (suggesting what court should consider when evaluating which party
should be awarded custody of pet). In its amicus brief on behalf of Houseman, the
Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) asked that the trial court assess the following:
"[h]ow might moving the dog impact his well-being?"; "[w]hich home is likely to
provide the best living experience for the dog?"; "[h]ave both parties shown a
commitment to the dog's health and well-being, including regular veterinary ap-
pointments, high quality food, and adequate exercise?"; and "[d]oes either home
have other residents (human or nonhuman) who might scare or intimidate the
dog, or alternatively, provide a positive impact?" Brief for Legal Defense Fund as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 53, at 25 n.9.
56. See Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in the "Legal
Thinghood" of Nonhuman Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179, 184 (2000) (recognizing trend
reflected in many authorities that courts are considering needs and interests of
companion animals when deciding future course of the pets' lives, and that is one
"crack" in strict property-law approach of prior cases); McLain, supra note 11 ("On
the other hand, while the analysis has differed from the traditional model .. . some
courts have, in a round-about way, certainly allowed the companion animal's best
interest to enter their decisions as to which human caretaker should be awarded
custody.").
57. See Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)(reversing decision that gave ownership to legal owner and allowing cat to "remain
where he has lived, prospered, loved and been loved for the past four years");
Newell, supra note 56, at 180 (citing Virginia case, Zovko v. Gregory, No. CH 97-
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the limited life expectancy of the ten-year-old pet and the fact that it had
lived and prospered in that environment for the past four years.5 8 Simi-
larly, a Virginia court held that the best interests of a cat took priority over
property rights in a battle for custody between former roommates.5 9
There, because there were no witnesses to testify about the initial gift of
the cat to one roommate, the judge awarded the pet to the non-owner
roommate who cared for it.6 0 While both of these courts were presented
with custody issues outside of a divorce or separation setting, the rulings
are still significant because the courts chose to reject the strict property
law framework and instead adopted a distinct standard based on the best
interests of the animal."
More recently, stemming from the criminal prosecution of profes-
sional football player Michael Vick, a Virginia district court approved the
Government's request to appoint a "guardian/special master" to advise
the court about the "appropriate final disposition" of forty-eight pit bulls
removed from Vick's property.6 2 By appointing animal behavior experts
to individually evaluate each dog for placement into a new home, the
court in effect ordered consideration of the best interests of the dogs.6 3
544 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 1997), which applied best interests of pet standard and
reached decision to award custody to roommate who shared closer bond with cat).
58. See Raymond, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 309 (resolving case based on facts in record).
59. See Tischler & Wagman, supra note 55 (stating that court in Zovko found
"happiness of [the cat]" more important than property rights).
60. See id. (pointing out that court gave possession to roommate that was not
original owner of cat); see also Huss, supra note 2, at 226-27 (observing that "the
judge said that he would decide 'what is in the best interest of Grady the cat' and
awarded the cat" to roommate who had cared for it more); Paek, supra note 5, at
512 ("The court in Zovko applied the 'best interests of the pet' standard in reach-
ing its decision and ruled against the original owner of Grady by awarding custody
to the owner's roommate who shared a closer bond with the cat.").
61. See Tischler & Wagman, supra note 55 (summarizing Zovko and Raymond in
order to demonstrate that "courts are beginning to reject a strict property analysis
and consider the best interests of the animal in deciding which party will be
awarded custody"); see also Sullivan & Vietzke, supra note 42, at 56 (hypothesizing
that "if the law begins to recognize animals as more than personal property, the
'best interest' standard may eventually become the rule").
62. See United States v. Approximately Fifty-Three Pit Bull Dogs, No.
3:07CV397 (E.D. Va. 2007) (ordering appointment of law professor to oversee
placement of dogs). See generally Brigid Schulte, Saving Michael Vick's Dogs, WASH.
PosT, July 7, 2008, at A01 (describing disposition of Vick's dogs following his
pleading guilty to running dogfight operation and noting that court gave dogs "a
second chance" when judge "ordered each dog to be evaluated individually" to
determine proper placement for adoption); Animal Law Blog, http://animallaw
online.blogspot.com/2009/01/what-happened-to-michael-vicks-dogs.html (Jan. 4,
2009, 10:35 EST) (featuring discussion of magazine article that provided update
on condition and whereabouts of dogs involved in Michael Vick's criminal case).
63. See Schulte, supra note 62, at A01 (detailing powers, duties, and obliga-
tions of expert); Animal Law Blog, supra note 62 (expressing opinion that what
court did with Vick's dogs "push [es] the boundaries of animal law" and "is defi-
nitely changing the way the legal system perceives and handles" issues of animal
custody, because "each dog was individually evaluated and placed based upon a
series of factors that can fairly be described as the best interests of the dog").
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In particular, the court listed numerous factors for the expert to consider
when evaluating the options for the pit bulls' final disposition, including
the dogs' potential quality of life and minimum standards for permanent
placement set by various organizations. 64
In addition to explicit consideration of the best interests of the
animal, one frequent scenario in which courts implicitly account for the
best interests of the companion animal occurs when one of the parties
mistreated the pet.6" Rather than an outright adoption of the best inter-
ests standard, which forces judges to view the facts from the perspective of
the animal, some courts emphasize one party's abuse or neglect of the pet
to justify their decision to stray from the traditional property law frame-
work. 66 These courts implicitly focus on the best interests of the pet by
declining to place it in a dangerous environment, regardless of whether
the courts hold the best interests standard applicable to companion
animals. 6 7
Finally, although not explicitly or implicitly applying a best interests
approach, some courts reject the traditional property law framework based
on public policy considerations. 68 For example, refraining from both the
traditional property and best interests approach to pet ownership disputes,
the Vermont Supreme Court awarded possession to the finder of a run-
64. See Schulte, supra note 62, at AO1 (providing guidelines for expert to
choose permanent residence for pit bulls).
65. See Juelfs v. Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 599 (Alaska 2002) (finding no abuse of
discretion where Superior Court modified property settlement regarding custody
of dog by removing all of wife's possessory rights because dog was being put in
danger by fights with wife's other dogs and actions of wife's new boyfriend); Vargas
v. Vargas, No. 0551061, 1999 WL 1244248, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (granting ownership and possession of couple's rottweiler
to wife, despite fact that dog was gift from wife to husband and was registered to
husband, after hearing testimony that husband was not treating dog well and hus-
band's home was not ideal for keeping dog); In re Marriage of Stewart, 356 N.W.2d
611, 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (asserting that "courts should not put a family pet in
position of being abused or uncared for," though refusing to determine dog's best
interests); Pratt v. Pratt, No. C4-88-1248, 1988 WL 120251, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Nov. 15, 1988) (unpublished opinion) ("While we agree that the child custody
statutes are inapplicable, the trial court can award the dogs to respondent in part
on evidence of mistreatment of the dogs.").
66. See Vargas, 1999 WL 1244248, at *4, *6 (unpublished opinion) (holding
that wife should receive ownership of dog where husband "acknowledged that on
occasion he spoke in loud terms to the dog and was very strict with the dog" and
wife "indicated that the plaintiff would give the dog away or shoot the dog in the
event that problems arose as concerns keeping the dog").
67. See Pratt, 1988 WL 120251, at *2 (unpublished opinion) (agreeing with
petitioner that Minnesota child custody statutes are inapplicable to case, yet main-
taining award of dogs to respondent in part because of evidence of mistreatment
of dogs involved in dispute).
68. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997) (holding that non-
owner is entitled to possession of dog when non-owner found it, posted lost dog
notices around community, and, after no one claimed it, took care of dog for more
than one year, even though original adopter and trainer of dog discovered it more
than one year later and asserted ownership).
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away dog when the dog's original owner, who had neglected the dog for
over a year, discovered its location and attempted to take it back.69 In
support of its holding, the court emphasized the public policy of encour-
aging citizens to care for lost dogs, and the notion that dogs have a subjec-
tive value to their possessors, which places them somewhere between a
person and a piece of personal property.70 Awarding the dog to someone
other than its legal owner would not have been permissible if the court
had regarded the pet as mere property.7 1
III. HOUSEMAN "BEST IN SHOW" OR "RUNT OF THE LIrrER"?
New Jersey's opportunity to inject itself into the pet custody debate
came in Houseman.72 This case led a New Jersey appellate court to spurn
tradition and require a more novel analysis than the traditional property
law framework.7 3 Ultimately spanning more than two years and costing
each litigant in excess of $20,000 in attorneys' fees, Houseman also under-
scored the great lengths pet owners will go to retain their treasured
companions. 74
A. Facts and Procedure: He's in the "Dog House"; She's at the Courthouse
Doreen Houseman and Eric Dare were on their way to becoming hap-
pily married.7 5 The couple had the house (a jointly owned residence in
Williamstown, N.J., purchased in 1999), the commitment (the two were
engaged to marry in 2000), and the family pet (a $1,500 pedigreed pug
69. See id. at 634 (awarding custody to finder of dog rather than dog's original
owner).
70. See id. at 633 ("Instead, courts must fashion and apply rules that recognize
their unique status, and protect the interests of both owner and finder, as well as
the public."). The court recognized that dogs have a subjective value to their own-
ers and noted that public policy required the court to allow the defendant to keep
the dog because granting her the dog after she found it and took care of it would
encourage citizens to care for lost dogs in similar circumstances. See id. at 635
(arguing in favor of upholding award of dog to defendant). A subsequent Ver-
mont case that referenced the Morgan opinion expressed support for the court's
awareness that "'a dog is an inherently social creature whose value derives from
the animal's relationship with its human companions.'" Lamare v. North County
Animal League, 743 A.2d 598, 603 (Vt. 1999) (quoting Morgan, 702 A.2d at 633).
71. See Morgan, 702 A.2d at 634 (choosing approach that would grant posses-
sion of dog to non-owner finder, thus rejecting traditional property law
principles).
72. See Gallagher, supra note 22 (reporting that Houseman "is the first family
law decision in NewJersey to recognize a special value in animals and one of only a
handful of cases across the country to grapple with the issue of custody").
73. See Posting of Neetal Parekh, supra note 19 (asserting that trial court
viewed case as "straightforward assignment of possession" using "simple property
law," but appellate court overruled decision).
74. See Ex Couple's Court Fight for Pug May Change Laws, supra note 23 (recount-
ing time and cost of custody dispute).
75. See Houseman v. Dare, 966 A.2d 24, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
(detailing thirteen-year relationship between couple).
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named Dexter).76 Suddenly, after thirteen years together, it all fell
apart.7 7 Dare ended the engagement in May 2006, and Houseman moved
out of their Williamstown home after transferring her interest in the real
property to Dare.78 Though the couple had no written agreement regard-
ing ownership and custody of their dog, Houseman claimed that Dare
orally agreed, immediately after the breakup, to allow her to keep Dex-
ter.79 Acting pursuant to the alleged agreement, Houseman took the dog
and "its paraphernalia" with her when she vacated the residence in July
2006.80 Houseman did permit Dare to take the dog for occasional visits,
after which he returned Dexter to Houseman's new residence. 8 ' In late
February 2007, Houseman went on vacation and left Dexter under Dare's
care.82 When she returned, Dare refused to relinquish the dog.8 3
76. See id. (describing purchases made by couple during their relationship).
Upon purchasing the dog, Houseman and Dare registered it with the American
Kennel Club and listed both parties as owners of the dog. See id. (reciting facts
related to purchase of Dexter).
77. See id. at 25-26 ("In May 2006 Dare decided to end his relationship with
Houseman.").
78. See id. at 26 (stating Dare's interest in remaining in jointly purchased
home).
79. See id. (expressing Houseman's immediate interest in keeping dog). Ac-
cording to Houseman, she and Dare agreed that she would be able to keep Dexter
and receive one-half the value of the jointly owned residence. See id. (detailing
oral agreement between parties after relationship ended). Dare represented to
Houseman that her share in the residence was worth $45,000, which he paid to
Houseman to obtain her interest in and eventually sell the residence. See id. (ex-
plaining other post-separation plans not relating to custody of pet). Houseman
asserted that she accepted Dare's conclusion that her interest in the home was
$45,000 because her primary concern was the dog and not the money for her
interest in the home. See id. (explaining importance to Houseman of retaining
possession of Dexter). At trial, Dare acknowledged that Houseman had inquired
into which of them would receive ownership of Dexter after he ended the engage-
ment, and he did not deny that he had promised to give her the dog. See id.
(recounting Dare's testimony at trial regarding post-divorce arrangements with
Houseman).
80. See id. (describing events following couple's breakup).
81. See id. (discussing custody status of Dexter prior to commencement of
suit). Expressing some concern with the custody issue and Dexter's ownership and
visitation arrangements, Houseman asked Dare to memorialize in writing the plan
that they had been implicitly following. See id. (illustrating Houseman's wish to
reduce agreement to written format). In his answer to Houseman's complaint,
Dare admitted to promising Houseman that he was trustworthy and would not
keep the dog from her. See id. ("Although Dare admitted to making that promise
in his answer to Houseman's complaint, he offered no testimony on that point at
trial.").
82. See id. (addressing Ms. Houseman's reason for filing initial complaint
against Mr. Dare).
83. See Shaffer, supra note 15 (listing what Houseman sought from court and
from Dare). Dare was still in possession of Dexter when the trial commenced nine
months later. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 26 (noting location of Dexter in Decem-
ber 2007 when trial began). The Superior Court explained that Dare's possession
of Dexter was a major factor that led the trial court to allow Dare to retain posses-
sion of the dog and award Houseman only monetary compensation supposedly
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Houseman subsequently filed suit, seeking specific performance of
the alleged oral agreement she had with her ex-fianc6 and a judgment
declaring her the dog's owner.84 In a pretrial ruling, the trial court con-
cluded that pets are personal property that "lack the unique value essen-
tial to an award of specific performance," thus precluding Houseman from
regaining possession of the dog despite the court's finding that the parties
had, in fact, agreed that Houseman should get post-separation custody of
the dog.8 5 Instead of ordering specific performance, the judge awarded
Houseman $1,500, the full intrinsic value of the dog to which the parties
had stipulated.8 6
B. The Appellate Court Throws Ms. Houseman a Bone
Houseman appealed the trial court's order, and the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded the
case.8 7 The Appellate Division concluded that specific performance was
"available to remedy a breach of an oral agreement about possession of a
dog reached by its joint owners," and that the trial court erred when it
refused to consider the availability of specific performance as a remedy
based on its determination that a pet is common, rather than unique,
property.8 8 The court ordered further proceedings on remand regarding
equal to Dexter's value. See id. at 27 (finding that trial court awarded Dare posses-
sion and awarded Houseman the pet's stipulated value).
84. See id. at 25 (stating Houseman's motivations for filing complaint). The
complaint stated that Dare breached the couple's oral agreement through wrong-
ful detention of the dog following a post-separation visit. See id. (describing House-
man's appeal). Houseman also alleged the tort of conversion, but the court
explained that this tort claim would be fully remedied by an award of specific per-
formance. See id. at 25 n.1 ("Because the right of ownership and possession House-
man seeks to vindicate are based solely on the alleged oral agreement, there is no
need to discuss this claim, which, if viable, would be fully addressed by an award of
specific performance of the oral agreement."). Thus, the Superior Court did not
address the tort claim during the appeal. See id. (refusing to examine other issues
because court ultimately held that specific performance may be available).
85. See id. at 26 (explaining impact of pretrial ruling on information
presented to trial court). The trial court did recognize the legitimacy of House-
man's claims concerning her ownership and possession of the dog, but it limited
presentation of evidence on this matter as a result of its pretrial ruling that dogs
were personal property and could not be the subject of a specific performance
order. See id. (noting that parties stipulated to value of dog and lower court fore-
closed Houseman's claim for specific performance, so record did not contain full
presentation of evidence).
86. See id. at 26-27 (providing summary of trial court's holding and damages
award). The appellate court noted that the trial court's holding was not set forth
with "unmistakable clarity" but that it suggested that Dare was able to retain the
dog solely because he had possession of Dexter at the time of the judicial decision.
See id. (examining trial court's findings relevant to dog's possession and
ownership).
87. See id. at 27-28 (stating conclusions of court).
88. See id. (expanding upon holding and explaining its implications for partic-
ular facts of case).
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the existence of an oral agreement about ownership and possession of
Dexter and the appropriateness of specific performance.8 9
The court's opinion was based primarily on contract law, though the
court also considered elements of family and animal law.9 0 Initially, the
court discussed the remedy of specific performance and when it can be
invoked to address the breach of an enforceable agreement.9 1 The Supe-
rior Court assumed that the trial court found that Houseman sufficiently
demonstrated the existence of an oral agreement. 92 Accordingly, the Su-
perior Court stated that specific performance was a proper remedy if: (1)
the agreement were enforceable, (2) monetary damages were inadequate
to protect Ms. Houseman's expectation interest, and (3) an order compel-
ling specific performance of the agreement would not "result in inequity
to the offending party, reward the recipient for unfair dealing or conflict
with public policy."9 3
89. See id. (setting forth procedures for when case reappears in trial court).
The appellate court recognized that the trial court was in the best position to eval-
uate the fairness implications of Houseman's request for specific performance. See
id. (delegating evaluation of equities implicated by request for possession of dog to
lower court). In its holding on remand, the trial court decided that although Dare
had paid for Dexter and for all of his veterinary bills, the dog was jointly held
property because the couple had lived together and they both cared for the pet.
See Posting of Neetal Parekh, supra note 19 (clarifying that trial judge deemed pet
property of both parties). Additionally, the appellate court ruled that Houseman
had not yet proven that Dare agreed to permanently give her the dog when the
couple split, so the court did not feel comfortable awarding her possession of Dex-
ter until the trial court heard more facts. See Hefler, supra note 1 (interpreting
appellate court's decision as refraining from giving dog to Houseman until hear-
ing further arguments from each party). Upon hearing testimony on remand, the
trial court ruled that both parties were owners of the dog and both loved the dog
sufficiently. SeeJan Hefler, judge Rules Couple Who Broke Up Must Share Dog, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
homepage/20090922-Judge-rules-couple who broke up-must_share_dog.html
(discussing trial court's ruling). As a result, the trial court required the parties to
share custody of Dexter. See id. (explaining that trial court ordered that parties will
take care of dog in five-week rotations).
90. See Posting of Eric J. Solotoff to N.J. Family Legal Blog, http://njfamily
law.foxrothschild.com/2009/03/articles/practice-issues/its-a-dogs-life-the-
appellate-division-issues-reported-decision-on-possession-of-a-dog/ (Mar. 10, 2009,
13:06 EST) ("Rather, the case came down to contract law."); see also Houseman, 966
A.2d at 28 (expressing doubt that courts have ability to decide cases from perspec-
tive of pet based on previous cases involving possession of animals).
91. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 27 (identifying concept of specific performance
and when court may appropriately apply it).
92. See id. (determining that trial court's findings relevant to dog suggested
that trial court found existence of oral agreement under which Houseman would
obtain possession of dog).
93. See id. (outlining standards for when specific performance can be or-
dered). Along with breach of contract claims, courts have employed the remedy of
specific performance in cases where an individual has tortuously acquired or
wrongfully detained property. See id. (citing cases and statutes concerning per-
sonal property with special subjective value in which courts have awarded specific
performance).
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The crux of the Superior Court's analysis concerned the second crite-
rion-the inadequacy of monetary damages-which the court noted is
generally satisfied when an agreement or contract concerns personal
property with strong sentimental attachment.9 4 In cases of strong senti-
mental attachment, the court reasoned that monetary damages are inade-
quate because of the special subjective value one derives from possession;
thus, in deciding whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy
for Houseman, the specific subjective value derived from possession of a
pet should be considered.9 5 The court noted that it had already acknowl-
edged in a different context that pets have a special value to their owners
beyond the pet's purchase price or replacement cost, and that courts in
other jurisdictions previously considered this value when resolving ques-
tions concerning possession.9 6 Further, the court posited that courts of
equity should not be hesitant to resolve competing claims for possession of
a pet by looking to "one party's sincere affection for and attachment to"
the pet because this type of analysis would be similar to the common
method for resolving competing claims to a family heirloom or other inan-
imate object, which are decided by looking to "one party's sincere senti-
ment" resulting from a relationship with the donor of the object.97
Presuming that courts are equipped to evaluate property's subjective value
to joint owners, the court explained that this could be accomplished in pet
custody disputes by simply looking to the facts and circumstances of each
party's interest in the pet.98
In its analysis, the court declined to apply the best interests standard
to determine Dexter's proper home.99 That standard, suggested to the
94. See id. (citing heirlooms, family treasures, and works of art as examples of
personal property to which owners feel strong sentimental attachment, thereby
rendering monetary damages inadequate).
95. See id. at 28 (providing basis for court to analyze who should receive own-
ership of Dexter).
96. See id. (reasoning, based on prior NewJersey holdings and general princi-
ples of contract law, that specific performance could be appropriate for agreement
concerning pet).
97. See id. (comparing disputes over personal property to disputes over owner-
ship of pets).
98. See id. (formulating analysis for court to determine piece of personal
property's unique subjective value to its owner). Typically, the value assigned to an
individual's emotional attachment is dictated by facts that give rise to the special
affection, such as the individual's relationship with the donor or the individual's
prior association with the property. See id. at 27 (demonstrating certain types of
facts and circumstances to which court could look to find subjective value). The
court suggested that it could examine each party's assertion of a special interest in
the property by looking at the "facts and circumstances which endow the chattel
with a special . . . value." See id. (directing lower courts as to proper inquiry).
Through an examination of the factual grounds for the special interest in the
property, courts must determine whether the special interest is sincere or based
upon an improper motive such as greed. See id. (providing instructions for how to
assess weight of testimony regarding subjective value of pet).
99. See id. (rejecting best interests analysis).
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court in briefs by amicus curiae, would have forced the court to resolve the
question of possession from the perspective of the pet.100 In declining to
conduct this evaluation, the court argued that it would be too difficult for
a judicial entity to attempt to predict the best interests of an animal be-
cause of the lack of "discoverable and manageable standards" in most
common pet custody disputes.1 0 1 Nonetheless, the court did not com-
pletely eliminate the possibility of using this framework in the future if a
case involved abuse or neglect of the pet by one of the parties. 0 2
Applying its newly formed standards, the court held that Houseman
presented enough evidence to require the trial court to examine the oral
100. See id. (discussing proposed analysis). Both the Animal Legal Defense
Fund and Lawyers in Defense of Animals advocated that the court undertake an
assessment of the best interests of Dexter to determine which party would get pos-
session. See id. at 25 n.2 ("By leave granted, the Animal Legal Defense Fund and
Lawyers in Defense of Animals both filed a brief as amicus curiae. They urge us to
adopt a rule that requires consideration of the best interests of the dog."); Brief of
Animal Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note
53, at 23 (advocating that court decide Houseman according to Dexter's best inter-
ests); Brief of Lawyers in Defense of Animals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appel-
lant, supra note 53, at 9 (urging court to analyze best interests of dog). In the
ALDF brief, the organization argued that "the bond between humans and their
animal companions ... demonstrates the need for consideration of Dexter's inter-
ests here." Brief of Animal Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellant, supra note 53, at 14. Similarly, Lawyers in Defense of Animals contended
that "in refusing to rule on the custody and care of the canine, Dexter, the trial
court failed to fulfill its mandate to determine all issues arising out of a family type
relationship in a manner consistent with public policy and reflective of society's
collective conscience." Brief of Lawyers in Defense of Animals as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant, supra note 53, at i.
101. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (expressing lack of confidence in courts'
ability to decide ownership from perspective of pet). In contrast, the amicus brief
from Lawyers in Defense of Animals contained a section opposing the notion that
courts could not adequately determine the best interests of an animal. See Brief of
Animal Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note
53, at 9 (contending that courts have ability to make determination of best inter-
ests). That section was titled: "The rules of court coupled with existing resources
provide the court with the tools to safeguard the interests of animals such as Dex-
ter within the time constraints imposed on the judicial system and the limitations
of the adversarial process." Id. The brief also recommended that the best interests
be determined by an outside expert, in order to lessen the burden on the courts of
conducting such an analysis. See id. (finding that courts have inherent power to
appoint experts, and noting one could be found for Houseman case who possesses
"sufficient knowledge of the immediate and long term economic and emotional
care needs of the species of animal in question" to "advise [the court] as to each of
the party's respective abilities to meet those needs and as to the most suitable ar-
rangement for meeting those needs"). For example, a court ordered the appoint-
ment of an individual expert to determine the best interests of numerous dogs
following Michael Vick's arrest for running a dogfighting ring and the subsequent
removal of the dogs from his residence. See Schulte, supra note 62, at AO1 (explain-
ing process for giving dogs homes following court decision to take them away from
Vick).
102. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (considering that best interests standard
might be employed in cases where parties act "contrary to public policies ex-
pressed in laws designed to protect animals").
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agreement and ascertain whether specific performance would be a proper
remedy.10 3 The court also found that Houseman sufficiently established
the special subjective value of Dexter through her testimony at trial and
her immediate effort to enforce her right of possession when Dare refused
to return the pet.10 4 Lastly, the court ruled that Dare had not established
that an order of specific performance would be harsh or oppressive, re-
ward Houseman for unfair actions, or operate against public policy.10 5
Thus, the court held that specific performance should be considered as an
available remedy, and remanded for the trial court to consider the propri-
ety of specific performance.1 0 6
IV. THE NEW JERSEY COURT "FETCHES" A WINNING APPROACH TO PET
CUSTODY LITIGATION
The New Jersey Superior Court's conclusion that, although a dog is
technically a piece of property, it is unique property with special value,
presents the most straightforward, logical approach to the issue of pet cus-
tody disputes.1 0 7 In response to the trial court's failure to appreciate what
pets mean to their human owners, the appellate court provided a legal
resolution by finding similarities between the way people value pets and
sentimental pieces of personal property. 108 Not only does this decision
advance the idea that a companion animal's value is not solely monetary,
but it also creates a model for courts to decide future pet custody disputes
in a more uniform manner.1 09
103. See id. at 29 (requiring that trial court consider validity of purported oral
agreement and propriety of specific performance).
104. See id. (acknowledging importance of dog to Ms. Houseman based on
factual circumstances of case). The court also ruled that Houseman's stipulation
to Dexter's intrinsic monetary value as $1,500 cannot be "viewed as a concession
that the stipulated value was adequate to compensate her for her loss of the special
value given her efforts to pursue her claim for specific performance at trial." Id.
105. See id. (applying general analysis for specific performance claim to facts
of case). Not only did Dare fail to establish that Houseman would be rewarded for
any unfair conduct or violations of public policy by obtaining possession of Dexter,
but the court reasoned that if there actually were an enforceable oral agreement
between the parties, an order allowing Dare to maintain possession would reward
him for his breach of the agreement. See id. (considering interests of parties press-
ing competing claims and public policies that may be implicated by awarding dog
to Houseman).
106. See id. (holding that trial court should have considered remedy of spe-
cific performance, and remanding for "further proceedings on the existence of an
oral agreement about ownership and possession of the dog and the propriety of
specific performance").
107. See id. at 28 (holding that pets have special subjective value).
108. See id. (allowing specific performance of agreements involving pets);
Hefler, supra note 89 ("The panel said that he was like a family heirloom, or a
piece of fine art, and that the judge should retry the matter, giving weight to what
Dexter meant to Houseman and Dare.").
109. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 238 (opining that "the use of fair market value
analysis in the case of household pets may bear little relation to their actual senti-
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A. A "Valuable" Precedent
Through its consideration of a pet's subjective value to its human
guardians, the Superior Court's ruling provides lower courts with an ana-
lytical framework analogous to disputes over heirlooms, family treasures,
and works of art that can be uniformly applied to all companion animal
custody cases. 110 Cases involving competing claims for inanimate objects
that induce a strong sentimental attachment arise frequently and contain
established criteria on which courts rely to determine possession.111 As a
result, family courts presented with competing claims for pets are well-
equipped to apply Houseman's subjective value consideration.' 12 Scrutiniz-
ing the concrete facts and circumstances relating to each party's affection
for and attachment to the pet "is really no different from the many cases
that award a particular piece of property to the party who asserts a greater
sentimental value" to the item.' 13
Moreover, because the court centered its analysis on the sentiments of
the litigants, courts can apply Houseman consistently to pet custody cases
without regard to certain variable facts.1 1 4 For example, the court did not
differentiate between the live-in couple in this case and a married couple
arguing over property following a divorce.1 15 Therefore, NewJersey's ap-
proach is suitable for disputes resulting from the dissolution of any type of
mental worth"); Paek, supra note 5, at 504 (stating that there exists "special rela-
tionship" between animal guardians and pets).
110. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (relaying proper analysis for courts of eq-
uity to undertake); Hefler, supra note 1 ("[T] he appeals panel said Dexter was like
'heirlooms, family treasures, and works of art' whose 'special subjective value'
should be factored in by the court.").
111. See Uluhogian v. Ulohogian, 408 N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(holding that lower court erred by failing to award gold cross to husband); Sum-
mer v. Summer, 615 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (deeming husband's
photographs to be marital property dividable by equitable distribution, but award-
ing ownership to husband because he generated collection of photographs and
photographs were more personal to him), affid, 85 N.Y.2d 1014 (N.Y. 1995); In re
Anderson, 766 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (modifyingjudgment to award
piano to wife because it had great sentimental value to her); Hoebelheinrich v.
Hoebelheinrich, 600 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing court to look to
intrinsic value of marital property, which is "a very subjective concept that looks to
the worth of the property to the parties and their marriage").
112. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (displaying confidence in lower courts to
evaluate parties' special interest in possession).
113. See Laura W. Morgan, Wo Gets Fluffy? Division of Pets in Divorce Cases, 11
DIVORCE Lmc. 113, 113 (1999) (finding similarities between awarding pets and
awarding marital property with sentimental value to particular party).
114. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 27 (delineating standards for assessing special
subjective value to parties).
115. See McLain, supra note 11 ("For example, the case Houseman v. Dare cen-
tered around a live-in couple who had been involved in a thirteen year relation-
ship, and the court in that case did not distinguish their situation from that of a
married couple.").
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relationship in which the parties have joint claims to an animal.' 1 6 Addi-
tionally, because the court must simply evaluate testimony and evidence
from the perspective of the human owners of the pet, Houseman is applica-
ble to custody battles over any species of animal.1 1 7 Finally, under the
rationale of Houseman, courts can require a subjective value consideration
in cases with or without a previous agreement between the parties. 118 In
sum, the standard used by the New Jersey court adds consistency to pet
custody litigation and alleviates the problems with the current ad hoc ap-
proach that leaves parties at the whim of the judge.1 19
B. (Not So) Best Interests?
When animal advocates and legal scholars seek to rectify the inconsis-
tent and arguably insensitive handling of pet custody litigation, they typi-
cally recommend legal revisions that require courts to identify the best
interests of the animal.120 Houseman rejected this type of review, yet the
court's holding still could appease those advocating a best interests ap-
proach.121 Applying Houseman entails an assessment of many of the same
factors and considerations that proponents of the best interests standard
have suggested. 122 By determining possession based on evidence of the
parties' subjective value in the pet, such as Ms. Houseman's testimony
about Dexter's importance in her life, the pet will be placed in an environ-
116. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (providing framework to determine posses-
sion in disputes over "jointly held property with special subjective value").
117. See id. (contrasting possibility of assessing owners' special interest in pet
from difficulty of deciding questions of possession from perspective of pet).
118. See id. (allowing courts to determine parties' special interest in cases
where parties are unable to agree about who will keep pet, "either because an
agreement is in dispute or there is none").
119. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 249 (commenting on dramatic variations be-
tween differentjurisdictions and courts in deciding pet custody disputes, and advo-
cating for development of clearer standards).
120. See Huss, supra note 2, at 227-29 (suggesting that states pass statutory
provisions for animal custody matters based on current laws relating to child cus-
tody, with best interests of animal acting as initial standard); Stroh, supra note 5, at
243-44 (establishing that certain scholars have urged judges to employ the "best
interests of the child" framework "to guide their selection of factors to be consid-
ered when making pet ownership determinations in divorce actions"); Paek, supra
note 5, at 521 ("Considering the best interests of the companion animal when
determining custody and visitation disputes acknowledges companion animals as
family members rather than property."); Posting of Matthew Liebman to Animal
Legal Defense Fund Blog, http://www.aldf.org/article.php?id=1007 (July 1, 2009)
(explaining organization's request for court to adopt best interests standard for
dogs). But see Britton, supra note 4, at 35-38 (creating point allocation system to
determine fate of pets in custody disputes that includes both property and non-
property considerations and "avoids the complications of equating pets with
children").
121. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (striking balance between strict property
analysis and fact-intensive best interest approach).
122. See id. (calling for limited analysis instead of full ad hoc inquiry).
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ment with someone who appreciates and cares for it.12 3 Furthermore, the
court's holding distinguished pets as more valuable than other inanimate
personal property and required the law to treat them as such in custody
disputes.124 This holding appreciates the significance of companion ani-
mals and is consistent with animal rights advocates' emphasis on the rec-
ognition of a pet's special value greater than its mere market cost.12 5
Finally, by including a caveat in its rejection of the best interests standard
for cases of abuse or neglect, the Superior Court implicitly recognized that
animals do have interests that must be protected in certain situations. 12 6
The New Jersey court, like other courts confronted with a request to
refrain from a property-based analysis, noted the practical limitations on a
court's ability to implement the best interests approach. 127 Asking a court
to determine a pet's best interests "would mean assuming the task of
resolving an interminable number of disputes," for which there would be
no legally founded answer.12 8 Along with the lack of "judicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for resolving questions of possession from
the perspective of a pet," courts may already be overwhelmed with child
custody proceedings.' 29 To burden family courts with more time-consum-
ing litigation would be unfeasible and require more judicial manpower
and docket space.13 0
Furthermore, though pet custody and child custody cases may be sim-
ilar in some respects, pet custody disputes are inherently different and
should be treated as such.13 1 Regardless of pet owners' opinions, compan-
ion animals are not children, and the legal system should not provide the
123. See Morgan, supra note 113, at 113 (supposing that courts can consider
"who would best care for the pet" when authorized to award possession).
124. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 25 (agreeing with appellant that trial court's
determination that pets are "personal property that lack the unique value essential
to an award of specific performance" was erroneous).
125. See id. at 28 (citing cases in which NewJersey courts recognized that pets
have special subjective value to owners); Shaffer, supra note 15 (acknowledging
that New Jersey's approach to pet custody disputes attempts "to recognize the spe-
cial status pets play in the fabric of our families").
126. See Posting of Matthew Liebman, supra note 120 (maintaining that
Animal Legal Defense Fund still had "cause for hope" because court qualified its
rejection of best interests standard with potential exceptional circumstances).
127. See Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28 (criticizing best interests approach)
128. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 234 (highlighting cases in which courts have
addressed difficulties of treating pets as anything other than property).
129. Houseman, 966 A.2d at 28; see also Stroh, supra note 5, at 234 (comment-
ing on high number of custody cases involving children).
130. See Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
("Determinations as to custody and visitation lead to continuing enforcement and
supervision problems (as evidenced by the proceedings in the instant case).").
131. See Britton, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing similarities between child cus-
tody cases and pet custody cases).
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two groups with equal rights and benefits.132 While maintaining the strict
property analysis overruled in Houseman would ignore the accepted fact
that pets are often treated as members of the family, enforcing a best inter-
ests analysis would create its own legal and philosophical dilemmas.' 33
New Jersey's "middle-ground" approach manages to avoid these practical
problems while attending to the interests of both the pet and its
owners.134
V. HOUSEMAN HAS BARK, BUT DOES IT HAVE BITE?
The New Jersey Superior Court's holding-though the product of a
court interpreting one state's laws and policies to resolve a narrow domes-
tic dispute-set a noteworthy precedent that directly and indirectly affects
the veterinary profession, the strategy of animal rights activists, and the
legal status of animals in several areas of the law.' 3 5 Based on the appel-
late court's opinion, animals are still viewed as property by New Jersey's
legal system; however, Houseman was a departure from a norm of estab-
lished animal law in its recognition of a pet's special subjective value that
differentiates it from other inanimate objects.' 36 Moreover, in contrast to
states like Pennsylvania, NewJersey did not apply a strict personal property
framework, and courts in New Jersey can now enforce certain agreements
entered into by divorcing or separating couples that provide for custody of
the pet.'3 7
132. See Bennett, supra note 6 (describing statement of American Veterinary
Medical Association member who argued "you have this strange phenomenon
where we're placing pets above certain people").
133. See Nolen, supra note 53 (interviewing Veterinary Medical Association
member who supported New Jersey decision).
134. See Hefler, supra note 1 ("Doreen Houseman is happy that her battle to
gain custody of Dexter the pug has won the support of pet lovers across the coun-
try."). For the argument that Houseman's standard of considering the subjective
value of the pet strikes the appropriate balance between the property and best
interests frameworks, see supra notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
135. See Posting of Matthew Liebman, supra note 120 (declaring that court's
acknowledgement of "significant bond that guardians have with their companion
animals" was "certainly a step forward" for animal rights activists). See generally,
Nolen, supra note 53 (highlighting impact of Houseman decision on veterinary
profession).
136. See Shaffer, supra note 15 (noting that Houseman maintained property
status of pets but considered them to have sentimental value beyond monetary
value).
137. Compare Houseman v. Dare, 966 A.2d 24, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009) ("The court's conclusion that specific performance is not, as a matter of law,
available to remedy a breach of an oral agreement about possession of a dog
reached by its joint owners is not sustainable."), with DeSanctis v. Pritchard, 803
A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (disallowing enforcement of supplementary
agreement because parties can not create visitation schedule for personal property
such as dogs).
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Veterinary organizations, wary of decisions that broaden a pet's
worth, reacted positively to the Houseman decision.' 3 8 By rejecting the
best interests standard and abstaining from setting a specific, non-eco-
nomic value to the pet, the court did not elevate animals' legal status to
the point that veterinarians would be exposed to increased liability for tort
claims.139 Had the appellate judges set "a price tag on the bond between
Houseman and the dog," rather than simply recognizing that pets have a
unique value, distressed pet owners would have had a stronger argument
to recover greater damages for veterinary negligence.140 While economic
damages such as the fair market value of the animal, the cost of a replace-
ment animal, and veterinary expenses may be awarded to owners, non-
economic damages including pain and suffering and loss of companion-
ship are not recoverable in nearly every state.141 Some commentators
have argued that allowing non-economic damages would actually reduce
the quality of medical care for animals.' 4 2 Veterinarians would be forced
to practice more defensively, take lesser risks, and the higher insurance
rates may "'put ordinary veterinary care beyond the reach of poorer
households."1 43 Though classifying animals as a type of property may stir
138. See Nolen, supra note 53 (referencing executive director of veterinary
organization who stated that veterinarians in New Jersey need not worry about
ruling in Houseman).
139. See id. ("Many veterinarians are leery of rulings that tinker with the legal
status of animals."). The property framework is well settled in tort law, where hold-
ings have repeatedly reaffirmed the legal status of pets as property. See Victor E.
Schwartz & Phil S. Goldberg, Animal Liability and Guardianship, THE STATE FACTOR:
JEFFERSONIAN PRINCIPLES IN ACTION (Am. Legislative Exch. Council, Wash., D.C.),Jan. 2006, at 2-3, available at http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/ALEC-State-Factor-
Animal-liability.pdf (listing state courts that have denied owners the ability to pur-
sue emotional distress damages for their pets).
140. See Nolen, supra note 53 (noting that court did not put actual economic
value on human-animal bond); see also Sullivan & Vietzke, supra note 42, at 45
("Perhaps the property classification is most limiting in the recovery for harm
done to the animal.").
141. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 139, at 1 (condemning personal
injury lawyers who want to "change well-established law and allow animal owners to
collect emotional harm damages in animal injury cases"); see also William C. Root,
Note, "Man's Best Friend": Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal
Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their
Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 425-32 (2002) (analyzing relationship
between animal's legal status and owner's right to recover damages in court);
Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense ofFloyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals
in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059, 1069-70 (1995) (considering value courts place on
animals when deciding damages recoverable to pet owners for pets' wrongful
death).
142. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 139, at 4-5 ("Animal health care
would resemble the human health care system, replete with dramatic increases in
costs caused by more defensive medicine and higher liability insurance
premiums.").
143. See id. at 3 (quotingJulia C. Martinez, Pet Bill Killed by House Sponsor Move
Outrages Senate Backer, DENVER PosT, Feb. 16, 2003, at BI).
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the emotions of animal lovers worldwide, it may be more beneficial for
their medical treatment and overall health. 14 4
Another beneficial implication of the court's ruling is that when pets
are classified as property, parties can legally assent to and courts can en-
force agreements regarding their ownership and care.1 45 Maintaining a
property-rooted definition of pets in custody disputes is crucial for the cre-
ation of binding contracts concerning the disposition of the pet-con-
tracts that can help the parties avoid costly, time-consuming litigation.14 6
These "antenuptial agreements" are legitimized under principles of con-
tract law, and judges can rightfully enforce their provisions just like any
other contract. 14 7 In contrast, public policy concerns lead courts to find
the same types of agreements (and other private contracts) regarding the
rights of the parties' children unenforceable. 148 Consequently, a modifi-
cation to the law that causes companion animals to be treated more like
children could prohibit the allocation of their legal rights through con-
tract, thus discouraging compromise between a pet's former joint-owners
before the judiciary is called upon to resolve a bitter dispute. 149
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the ad hoc nature of pet custody cases and the lack of pub-
lished opinions in many states, Houseman's impact could be more wide-
spread than a typical decision of a state appellate court concerning a
domestic matter.1 5 0 The case gained national media coverage not only for
its timely and relevant subject matter, but also because it established a pre-
cedent that many people supported.1 5 1 New Jersey's holding rests some-
144. See id. at 7 ("While some advocates of introducing non-economic dam-
ages into animal litigation . . . may have good intentions, adopting these changes
would result in bad public policy.").
145. See McLain, supra note 11 (observing that pet premarital agreements are
contracts that would generally be recognized by courts).
146. See id. (referencing attorney who emphasized that couples might use
agreements to avoid litigation); see also Stroh, supra note 5, at 249 (positing that
couples may use agreements to "anticipate belatedly any potential pet ownership
squabbles and agree" to resolutions).
147. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 250 (recognizing courts' acceptance of ante-
nuptial agreements based on contract law principles).
148. See id. at 249-50 ("Concern for the rights of children often leads courts to
find such antenuptial agreements unenforceable in child custody determina-
tions."); see also Huss, supra note 2, at 230 (providing that agreements "waiving
child support, custody or visitation" are frequently held unenforceable).
149. See Stroh, supra note 5, at 250 (illustrating that judicial preference for
deeming animals personal property allows judges to enforce antenuptial
agreements).
150. Cf Britton, supra note 4, at 8 ("Although they do exist, few family law
cases are officially reported so the relative scarcity of pet custody cases is not
surprising.").
151. See, e.g., Posting of Matthew Liebman, supra note 120 ("It recognized and
considered the sentimental attachment that Ms. Houseman had to Dexter. That is
certainly a step forward."); see also Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997)
4732010] NoTE
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where between the strict property application of the common law and the
animal-friendly best interests analysis.' 5 2 As a middle-ground approach, it
elevates the traditional legal status of pets at the center of custody disputes
without modifying the law so that companion animals are afforded too
much weight in other areas of the law.s5 3 Other jurisdictions seeking a
standard approach to resolving this emerging legal issue that relies on
well-defined principles of property and contract law may refer to the Ap-
pellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court for guidance.' 5 4
Eric Kotloff
(acknowledging subjective value of pets and idea that pets do not fit neatly within
traditional property law principles, while rejecting best interests standard).
152. For a discussion of the foundational principles of these divergent meth-
ods of determining pet custody, see supra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
153. See Shaffer, supra note 15 ("In the middle are many states like NewJersey
that attempt to recognize the special status pets play in the fabric of our families.").
The NewJersey Superior Court's holding in Houseman was also viewed positively by
the veterinary community. See Nolen, supra note 53 (detailing veterinary commu-
nity's response to Houseman ruling).
154. See Houseman v. Dare, 966 A.2d 24, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
(applying contract principle of specific performance to pet custody dispute).
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